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Abstract
Distributed storage systems in the presence of a wiretapper are considered. A distributed storage system (DSS) is parameterized
by three parameters (n, k, d), in which a file stored across n distributed nodes, can be recovered from any k out of n nodes.
This is called as the reconstruction property of a DSS. If a node fails, any d out of (n− 1) nodes help in the repair of the failed
node so that the regeneration property of the DSS is preserved. For such a (n, k, d)-DSS, two types of wiretapping scenarios are
investigated: (a) Type-I (node) adversary which can wiretap the data stored on any l < k nodes; and a more severe (b) Type-II
(repair data) adversary which can wiretap the contents of the repair data that is used to repair a set of l failed nodes over time.
The focus of this work is on the practically relevant setting of exact repair regeneration in which the repair process must replace
a failed node by its exact replica. We make new progress on several non-trivial instances of this problem which prior to this work
have been open.
The main contribution of this paper is the optimal characterization of the secure storage-vs-exact-repair-bandwidth tradeoff
region of a (n, k, d)-DSS, with n ≤ 4 and any l < k in the presence of both Type-I and Type-II adversaries. While the problem
remains open for a general (n, k, d)-DSS with n > 4, we present extensions of these results to a (n, n − 1, n − 1)-DSS, in
presence of a Type-II adversary that can observe the repair data of any l = (n − 2) nodes. The key technical contribution of
this work is in developing novel information theoretic converse proofs for the Type-II adversarial scenario. From our results, we
show that in the presence of Type-II attacks, the only efficient point in the storage-vs-exact-repair-bandwidth tradeoff is the MBR
(minimum bandwidth regenerating) point. This is in sharp contrast to the case of a Type-I attack in which the storage-vs-exact-
repair-bandwidth tradeoff allows a spectrum of operating points beyond the MBR point.
I. INTRODUCTION
A continuous rise in the volume of data managed across various systems, calls for new storage mechanisms that maintain
this data reliably. Distributed storage is the default technique for storing data in all new generation applications. The data
from a file is stored in a decentralized manner on several un-reliable nodes/disks that when collectively used are capable of
recovering the entire file. To ensure robustness to disk failures, the simplest scheme is to replicate and store the data across
several disks. For instance, the Google File System (GFS) and the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) store 3 copies of
the data across several nodes [1]. While replication is robust to failures, it is not a scalable strategy to store large volumes of
data. As an alternative, erasure codes (for instance, Reed-Solomon codes) have been used by Facebook, OceanStore, RAID-6
[2] and others to introduce redundancy into the storage system. However, to repair a failed node, the entire file must be
downloaded from the remaining alive nodes. Thus, the repair process for such codes can be excessively bandwidth intensive.
The concept of regenerating codes for distributed storage was introduced in the seminal work by Dimakis et al. [3]. A typical
distributed storage system (DSS) consists of n storage nodes each with a storage capacity of α (symbols or units of data) such
that the entire file of size B can be recovered by accessing any k ≤ n nodes. This is called as the reconstruction property of
the DSS. Whenever a node fails, d nodes (where k ≤ d ≤ n) participate in the repair process by sending β units of data each.
This procedure is termed as the regeneration of a failed node and β is often referred to as the per-node repair bandwidth.
In [3], the authors show that the in order to store a file of size B, the parameters of a DSS must necessarily satisfy
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min (α, (d− i)β) . (1)
Thus, in order to store a file of size B, there exists a fundamental tradeoff between α (storage) and dβ (total repair bandwidth).
Furthermore, it was shown that the reconstruction-regeneration requirements of a DSS can be equivalently formulated as a
multicasting problem over an appropriately defined graph. This revelation along with the celebrated result of network coding
for multicasting over graphs [4] were used to show that this tradeoff is indeed achievable. However, this tradeoff is in general
achievable only for the functional-repair case. In functional repair, a failed node is replaced by a new node such that the
resulting DSS has the same reconstruction and regeneration capabilities as before. In particular, the content of the repaired
node may not necessarily be identical to the failed node even though the desirable properties of the DSS are preserved.
In contrast to functional repair, exact repair regeneration requires the repair process to replace a failed node with an identical
new node. Exact repair is appealing for many practical applications where the data has to be stored intact. The file recovery
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process is also easier in this case compared to the functional repair scenario since the file reconstruction procedure need
not change whenever a failed node is replaced. While characterizing the storage-vs-bandwidth tradeoff for the case of exact
repair remains a challenging open problem in general, two extreme points of this tradeoff (depending on whether α or β
is minimized first) have been studied extensively. They are the minimum storage regenerating (MSR) and the minimum
bandwidth regenerating (MBR) points for which the explicit exact-repair regenerating codes have been developed (see [5],
[6] and references therein). Beyond these results, Tian [7] has recently characterized the optimal exact-repair tradeoff for the
(4, 3, 3)-DSS where it has been shown that there is a gap between the optimal tradeoffs for functional repair and exact repair.
Sensitive data such as personal, health and financial records are increasingly being stored in a DSS. Securing such data
from adversaries/eavesdroppers is necessary to ensure data secrecy for the users. Hence a DSS should be secure apart from
satisfying the reconstruction and regenerating requirements. Two types of eavesdropping attacks can potentially occur in a DSS,
(a) Type-I attack, in which the eavesdropper can wiretap the storage contents of l nodes in the DSS and (b) Type-II attack,
in which the eavesdropper wiretaps the contents of the repair data (and thereby the storage content as well) of l nodes in the
DSS. Throughout this paper, we assume that l < k since k is the minimum number of nodes required to reconstruct the entire
file of size B. Else, if l ≥ k, the eavesdropper can recover the file by using the reconstruction property of the DSS. Encryption
and decryption i.e., cryptographic approaches to ensure data security have been deemed to offer less secrecy compared to other
information/coding theoretic approaches [11]. Further, handling secure key management issues in a DSS are more complicated
compared to developing information theoretically secure codes that offer the desired level of secrecy.
The concept of security in a DSS against Type-II attacks was introduced in [9] where, linear codes that achieve the optimal
tradeoff region in the bandwidth limited regime were proposed. In the context of DSS, secure exact repair regenerating codes
are beneficial as the functional repair process may reveal additional information such as coding coefficients that are used in the
process of regenerating a functionally equivalent node [8]. Optimal exact repair codes that are secure against eavesdropping
have been explored for the MSR and MBR points in [10]-[12]. The codes developed in [10] achieve the MBR point for all
(n, k, d) configurations with any l < k. The MSR code in [10] was shown to be optimal for Type-I attacks while it was shown
to be optimal for Type-II attacks with l = 1 in [11]. The maximum file size B that can be securely stored using linear MSR
codes with exact repair was studied in [12] and proved to be optimal for d = n− 1.
As an example, consider the (3, 2, 2)-DSS and consider the setting in which the wiretapper can only read the contents of
any l = 1 node (Type-I adversary). For this setting, a secure exact repair code for this problem is shown in Fig. 1. When
the 1st node fails, the other nodes send their data contents to enable its repair. Using these two data symbols, the 1st node
can recover its initial data contents (since two symbols can be recovered using two linearly independent combinations) thus
satisfying the exact repair requirements. Since the eavesdropper is unaware of the secure key K, it cannot recover the data
symbol X by wiretapping on any single node in the DSS.
Now, consider the same (3, 2, 2)-DSS in the presence of a more powerful Type-II adversary that can observe the repair data
of any l = 1 node. It is clear that the code in Figure 1 will leak out the entire data X during the repair of node 1, as the
wiretapper can use X + 2K,X + 3K, (2 linear combinations of 2 symbols) to recover X . Thus, a different secure exact repair
DSS that can handle a Type-II adversary is shown in Fig. 2. It is seen that the storage capacity should be increased to α = 2
in this case compared to the Type-I attack (where α = 1). Since the eavesdropper is not aware of the keys K1 and K2, it
cannot get any information about the message symbol X even if it observes the repair data of any one node.
From these schemes, the secure repair scheme in Figure 2 requires higher storage per-node (α = 2) compared to the secure
node scheme in Figure 1 (α = 1 per-node). Thus, a natural question arises: does there exist a DSS with a smaller storage per
node α < 2 that can store a file of size B = 1, with repair bandwidth β = 1 while still preserving the security of the repair
process? Or, equivalently, is there any other more efficient tradeoff pair (α
′
, β
′
) than (α, β) = (2, 1) that can store a file of
size B = 1 while ensuring secure exact repair ?
In this paper, we answer this question in the negative through an information theoretic converse proof that shows that if
secure and exact repair requirements are imposed, then the storage per-node cannot be smaller than α = 2 and hence the
scheme in Figure 2 is optimal. Equivalently, our result shows that the only efficient point in the (α, β) tradeoff for this example
is the MBR point which corresponds to α = dβ. This result is extended and generalized for any (n, n − 1, n − 1)-DSS and
Type-I/Type-II adversaries for l = (k − 1) = (n− 2).
We next summarize the main contributions of this paper.
1) We characterize and prove the optimal exact repair region that is achievable under Type-I and Type-II attacks for the
(n, k, d)-DSS with n ≤ 4 and l < k. Specifically, we look at (3, 2, 2)-DSS with l = 1, (4, 2, 3)-DSS with l = 1 and
(4, 3, 3)-DSS with l = 1, 2. The main contributions of this paper are the novel converse proofs that characterize the
strorage-vs-bandwidth tradeoff region against Type-II attacks for these distributed storage systems.
2) For the (4,3,3)-DSS with l = 1 and Type-I attack, we leverage upon the characterization of the exact repair region
obtained in the absence of an eavesdropper in [7]. Specifically, we introduce the additional security constraint in order
to obtain the secure storage-vs-bandwidth tradeoff region in this case. Further, a novel code construction for this storage
and bandwidth efficient region of the tradeoff curve is also introduced. This code construction also achieves the optimal
exact repair region for (4, 3, 3) in the absence of any eavesdroppers and is shown to be read efficient (in terms of the
number of disk reads required to repair/recover a file [13]) when compared to the code given in [7].
3) These results are extended and proved for a general (n, n− 1, n− 1)-DSS when any l = n− 2 nodes are compromised
in the DSS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the system and the eavesdropper’s model. The main
theorems that describe the optimal achievable storage-bandwidth tradeoff regions are given in Section III and are proved in the
Appendix. The intuition behind the converse proofs is explained in Section IV. The coding schemes that achieve these optimal
regions are presented in Section V. Finally conclusions are drawn in Section VI1.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A (n, k, d, α, β,B)-DSS consists of n storage nodes that store a file F of size B across n nodes, with each node capable
of storing up to α units of data. A data collector can connect to any k < n nodes and must be able to reconstruct the entire
file F . This is known as the MDS property of the DSS [3]. We focus on the scenario of single node failures in which at any
given point any one node in the system could fail. For the repair of a failed node, any d out of the remaining (n − 1) alive
nodes can be accessed by downloading up to β ≤ α symbols to repair the failed node. The parameter dβ is referred to as the
total repair bandwidth.
From an information theoretic perspective, the goal is to store a file F , whose entropy is B, i.e.,
H(F ) = B. (2)
We next introduce random variables corresponding to the data stored in the nodes and the random variables used in the file
recovery and the repair process. Let Wi denote the content that is stored at node i, for i = 1, 2 . . . , n. Hence, the storage
constraint implies
H(Wi) ≤ α, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (3)
Due to the MDS property (i.e., the file B must be reconstructed from any k ≤ n nodes), we also have
H
(
F |W{k}
)
= 0, (4)
where W{k} is the data stored in any subset of k storage nodes. Next, we consider the repair of a failed node j from any d
remaining nodes. We denote the data sent by node i to repair node j by Sij . Due to the repair bandwidth constraint, we have
H(Sij) ≤ β, (5)
and for exact repair of node j from the repair data of d nodes, we also have
H(Wj |Sr1j , Sr2j , . . . , Srdj) = 0, {ri}di=1 ∈ [1, n] 6= j. (6)
Finally, we note that any repair data sent by node i, i.e., Sij is a function of the data stored in node i, i.e., H(Sij |Wi) = 0.
1Parts of this paper will be presented at ITA-2014 [16] and ICC-2014 [17].
A. Adversarial Models
We next formalize the Type-I and Type-II security constraints, each corresponding to different capabilities of the wiretapping
adversary.
• Type-I (node) security: in this setting, the wiretapper can read the storage content of any l < k nodes. Hence, we require
that the information leakage by revealing the data of any l storage nodes must be zero, i.e.,
I
(
F ;W{l}
)
= 0, (7)
where W{l} is the data stored in any subset of l nodes.
• Type-II (repair) security: in this setting, the wiretapper can read the repair data of any l < k nodes over time. Hence, for
the repair of any l nodes to be secure, we require
I (F ;Sn1 , Sn2 , . . . , Snl) = 0, (8)
where Sni is the data (downloaded from d repair nodes) used in the repair of node ni. Furthermore, it is worth noting
that any DSS that is secure under Type-II secrecy constraint is also secure under Type-I secrecy constraint but the reverse
statement is not true in general.
To illustrate these constraints, consider the (n, k, d) = (3, 2, 2)-DSS. Then, the constraints regarding file-regeneration and exact
repair are as follows:
File Regeneration:
H(F |W1,W2) = H(F |W1,W3) = H(F |W2,W3) = 0.
Exact Repair:
H(W1|S21, S31) = H(W2|S12, S32) = H(W3|S13, S23) = 0.
Repair data functionality:
H(S12, S13|W1) = H(S21, S23|W2) = H(S31, S32|W1) = 0.
For this example, the parameter l can be either 0 and 1. The non-trivial case is l = 1, for which the Type-I constraints can be
written as:
I(F ;W1) = I(F ;W2) = I(F ;W2) = 0.
whereas the Type-II security constraints are:
I(F ;S21, S31) = I(F ;S12, S32) = I(F ;S13, S23) = 0.
We next define the Type I (respectively Type-II) secrecy capacity of a DSS as the maximum file size that can be stored
under the constraints placed on storage (3), file regeneration (4), repair bandwidth constraint (5), exact repair (6) and Type-I
(respectively Type-II) secrecy constraint. Formally, we define the Type-I secrecy capacity as
BSI = max
(3)−(6),(7)
H(F ), (9)
and the Type-II secrecy capacity as
BSII = max
(3)−(6),(8)
H(F ). (10)
The study of distributed storage systems in the presence of a passive wiretapper was initiated in [9]. It was shown that for any
(n, k, d)-DSS with either Type-I or Type-II secrecy constraint (characterized by the parameter l), the following is an upper
bound on the maximum secure file size BS :
BS ≤
k−1∑
i=l
min(α, (d− i)β). (11)
Intuitively, this result can be interpreted as follows. In the presence of a wiretapper, the maximum file size a DSS can store
must necessarily reduce (compared to (1)) because l nodes are wiretapped. Since l nodes are compromised, at most (k − l)
nodes can help a data collector in recovering the entire file while keeping it secure from l nodes. Hence the summation is over
(k − l) nodes as opposed to k nodes [10]. To illustrate by an example, consider the (3, 2, 2)-DSS with l = 1 for which the
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upper bound in (11) simplifies to
BS ≤ min(α, β). (12)
Normalizing (12) throughout by BS , and defining α = α/BS , β = β/BS , we can equivalently write 1 ≤ min(α, β). This
bound gives rise to a region in the (α, β) plane and is shown in Fig. 3 with the corner point (α, β) = (1, 1). Furthermore, it is
not difficult to show that this tradeoff is achievable under Type-I security constraints by showing that it is possible to store a
file of size BS = 1 using α = 1 and β = 1. The scheme is shown in Figure 1. Hence, the upper bound in (12) along with the
scheme of Figure 1 imply that the optimal (α, β)-tradeoff for (3, 2, 2)-DSS, l = 1 in presence of a Type-I adversary is given
by
BSI ≤ min(α, β). (13)
As for the more stringent Type-II security is concerned, it has been shown by Shah et al in [10], using the Product-Matrix
framework at the MBR point (α = dβ), that it is possible to store a file of size BS = 1 using α = 2 and β = 1. This scheme
(shown in Figure 2) shows that the following (α, β)-tradeoff region is achievable:
BSII ≤ min
(α
2
, β
)
. (14)
On the other hand, the bound in (12) implies that the optimal (α, β)-tradeoff region for the Type-II secrecy constraint is
contained in:
BSII ≤ min(α, β). (15)
Thus, there exists a significant gap between these two regions for the Type-II secrecy constraint. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether the gap is due to the weakness of the upper bound or if there exists an improved achievable scheme that can close
this gap. In this paper, we show that this gap is fundamental to the secure exact repair problem and the upper bound can be
improved. By deriving a novel information theoretic converse, we show that for the (3, 2, 2)-DSS, l = 1 and Type-II secrecy
constraint, we show that the optimal secure storage-repair-bandwidth tradeoff is given by
BSII ≤ min
(α
2
, β
)
. (16)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we outline the main theorems that describe the optimal secure storage-vs-exact repair-bandwidth tradeoffs
(in short referred to as (α, β)-tradeoff region) under the exact repair requirement.
Theorem 1: The optimal (α, β)-tradeoff regions for (3, 2, 2)-DSS with l = 1 under exact repair are given by:
BSI ≤ min(α, β), (17)
BSII ≤ min
(α
2
, β
)
. (18)
The converse proof for (17) follows directly from (11) and is therefore omitted. The main contribution is the converse proof
for the bound (18) which is given in Section IV.
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Theorem 2: The optimal (α, β)-tradeoff regions for (4, 2, 3)-DSS with l = 1 under exact repair are given by:
BSI ≤ min(α, 2β) (19)
BSII ≤ min
(
2α
3
, 2β
)
. (20)
The bound in (19) follows directly from (11). The converse proof for (20) is given in Section VII-A in the Appendix.
Theorem 3: The optimal (α, β)-tradeoff regions for (4, 3, 3)-DSS with l = 1 under exact repair are given by:
BSI ≤ min
(
min(α, 2β) + min(α, β),
α+ 6β
3
)
(21)
BSII ≤ min (α, 3β) . (22)
The first term in (21) is directly from the upper bound given in (11). The converse proof for the second term in (21) is one
novel contribution of this paper. This proof is leveraged off the proof of exact repair given for the (4, 3, 3)-DSS without any
secrecy constraints in [7]. This is presented in Section VII-B1 in the Appendix. A novel converse proof for the bound in (22)
under the Type-II constraints is given in Section VII-B2 in the Appendix.
Theorem 4: The optimal (α, β)-tradeoff regions for (4, 3, 3)-DSS with l = 2 under exact repair are given by:
BSI ≤ min(α, β) (23)
BSII ≤ min
(α
3
, β
)
. (24)
The bound in (23) follows directly from (11). Hence the proof is skipped. The converse proof for (24) is given in Section VII-C
in the Appendix.
Theorem 5: The optimal (α, β)-tradeoff regions for (n, n− 1, n− 1)-DSS with l = n− 2 under exact repair are given by:
BSI ≤ min(α, β) (25)
BSII ≤ min
(
α
n− 1 , β
)
. (26)
This is an extension of the Theorems 1 and 4 to a general (n, n−1, n−1)-DSS. This is the worst case scenario with respect
to the (n, n− 1, n− 1)-DSS since l = k− 1 nodes are compromised and hence the file size that can be stored securely is the
minimum among all possible l < k scenarios. Similar to the Theorems 1-4 the proof of (25) is omitted as it is derived from
(11). The proof for (26) is a novel extension of the converse proofs given for (18) (24) and is provided in the Appendix in
Section VII-D.
Figs. 3-7 show the optimal (α, β) tradeoff regions described by Theorems 1-5. From these theorems, it is seen that the only
efficient point in the optimal (α, β)-tradeoff region for the Type-II constraints is the MBR point where α = dβ. However, this
is different from the optimal tradeoff-region achievable under Type-I constraints as seen in these results. Thus there is a gap
between the optimal regions achievable under these two constraints i.e., the file size that can be securely stored under Type-II
constraints is lower than the file size achieved under Type-I constraint.
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Further notice that the gap between these two constraints with respect to the secure file size increases as n increases in the
DSS. For the Type-I attacks, when l = n−2 and k = n−1, only one node can securely store the file and hence the maximum
file size that can be securely stored is given by (25) which is independent of n, while it decreases due to the wiretapping
process as seen in (26) (a more stringent constraint on the DSS).
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 AND INTUITION BEHIND CONVERSE PROOFS
In this section, we present the proof of the Theorem 1 i.e., (3, 2, 2)-DSS with l = 1 in order to explain the intuition behind
the novel converse proofs that establish the secure storage-vs-bandwidth repair tradeoff region against Type-II attacks. The
converse proofs for the other Theorems are presented in the Appendix.
Let F be the random variable that denotes the file stored on the DSS. For the (3, 2, 2)-DSS with l = 1, the bound in (11)
(corresponding to Type-I attack) is given by
H(F ) ≤ min(α, β). (27)
In the Type-I attack, the stored content of any l = 1 node must not reveal any information about the file F . For instance, the
content stored in node 1 must not reveal any information about F , i.e., the DSS must satisfy I(F ;W1) = 0. Using such Type-I
security constraints, one can readily show that H(F ) ≤ min(α, β) as follows:
H(F ) = H(F |W1) (28)
= H(F,W1)−H(W1) (29)
≤ H(F,W1,W2)−H(W1) (30)
= H(W1,W2) + H(F |W1,W2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (file regeneration)
−H(W1) (31)
= H(W1,W2)−H(W1) (32)
= H(W2|W1) (33)
Next, the conditional entropy H(W2|W1) can be expanded in two distinct ways as follows:
(a) By bounding this term as
H(W2|W1) ≤ H(W2) ≤ α, (34)
gives the bound H(F ) ≤ α.
(b) On the other hand, we can also bound this term as
H(W2|W1) ≤ H(W2, S32|W1) (35)
= H(S32|W1) +H(W2|S32,W1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (repair of node 2)
(36)
= H(S32|W1) (37)
≤ H(S32) ≤ β, (38)
which gives the bound H(F ) ≤ β.
While this bound H(F ) ≤ min(α, β) is tight for the case of Type-I attack, it turns out to be strictly sub-optimal for the case of
more severe Type-II attack. In particular, for the Type-II attack, in order to secure the DSS from an eavesdropper that wiretaps
the repair process of any single node (l = 1), the DSS must satisfy the following three security constraints:
I(F ;S21, S31) = I(F ;S12, S32) = I(F ;S13, S23) = 0, (39)
to indicate the secure repair of nodes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. If the eavesdropper can read (S21, S31), i.e., the repair data for
W1, then two cases can arise:
• if there is no redundancy in the repair process (α = dβ), then it is clear that if the stored data is secure, then the repair
data will also be secure.
• However, for α < dβ, more information about the file could be leaked in general. This aspect is not captured by the proof
for the Type-I attack and one needs to carefully deal with the security of the repair process.
We have the following sequence of bounds for secure repair of node 1,
H(F ) = H(F |S21, S31) (40)
= H(F, S21, S31)−H(S21, S31) (41)
≤ H(F,W2, S21, S31)−H(S21, S31) (42)
= H(W2, S21, S31) +H(F |W2, S21, S31)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (file regeneration)
−H(S21, S31) (43)
= H(W2, S21, S31)−H(S21, S31) (44)
= H(W2, S21, S31)−H(S21, S31,W1) +H(W1|S21, S31)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (repair of node 1)
(45)
= H(W2, S21, S31)−H(S21, S31,W1) (46)
= H(W2, S21, S31)−H(S21, S31,W1, S12, S13) +H(S12, S13|W1, S21, S31)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(47)
≤ H(W2, S21, S31)−H(S21, S31, S12, S13), (48)
where (43) follows from the file regeneration requirement from nodes (1, 2), (47) follows from the fact that (S12, S13) are
functions of W1. Similarly, for secure repair of node 2, we have
H(F ) ≤ H(W1, S12, S32)−H(S12, S32, S21, S23). (49)
Adding (48) and (49), we have
2H(F ) ≤ H(W2, S21, S31) +H(W1, S12, S32)−H(S21, S31, S12, S13)−H(S12, S32, S21, S23) (50)
= H(W2, S21, S31) +H(W1, S12, S32)− 2H(S21, S12)−H(S31, S13|S21, S12)−H(S23, S32|S21, S12) (51)
≤ H(W2, S21, S31) +H(W1, S12, S32)−H(S21, S12)−H(S12, S21, S13, S31, S23, S32) (52)
= H(W2, S21, S31) +H(W1, S12, S32)−H(S21, S12)−H(S12, S21, S13, S31, S23, S32,W2) (53)
≤ H(W2, S21, S31) +H(W1, S12, S32)−H(S21, S12)−H(W2, S21, S31) (54)
= H(W1, S12, S32)−H(S21, S12) (55)
≤ H(W1,W3, S12, S32)−H(S21, S12) (56)
= H(W3, S12) +H(W1, S32|W3, S12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−H(S21, S12) (57)
= H(W3, S12)−H(S21, S12) (58)
≤ H(W3, S12)−H(S12) (59)
≤ H(W3) +H(S12)−H(S12) (60)
= H(W3) (61)
≤ α. (62)
where
• (53) is obtained by noting that W2 is a function of the repair data S12, S32,
• (54) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy,
• (58) is obtained by noting the fact that (W1,W2) can be obtained from (W3, S12). To note this, first observe that (S32, S31)
are functions of W3, hence using (S32, S12), we can repair W2 (and subsequently obtain S21). Thus, using (S21, S31),
we can repair W1.
Hence from (62), we have H(F ) ≤ α2 . Thus along with the bound H(F ) ≤ β, we have the proof for
H(F ) ≤ min
(α
2
, β
)
(63)
Interestingly, this tradeoff between (α, β) only has one efficient point (see Fig. 3), corresponding to the case when α = 2β
(or the MBR point for the (3, 2, 2) DSS). Extending this approach to more general (n, k, d)-DSS is far from trivial. The proof
presented above essentially couples two security constraints corresponding to the secure repair of nodes 1 and 2. In general,
we believe that it suffices to consider the coupling between
(
k
l
)
security constraints, (each constraint corresponding to the
secure repair of l nodes). As we show in the Appendix, this statement turns out to be true for the (4, 2, 3), (4, 3, 3) and the
(n, n− 1, n− 1) DSS and helps us in establishing the corresponding optimal tradeoff regions.
V. ACHIEVABILITY PROOFS
In this section, we present coding schemes that achieve the bounds mentioned in Theorems 1-5. We first present the
achievability of the MBR point under Type-II secrecy constraint. Later, the coding schemes that achieve a various spectrum
of points beyond the MBR point in the presence of a Type-I adversary are presented.
A. Achievability under Type-II security constraint
As mentioned earlier, the MBR point is the only valid point in the (α, β) tradeoff region in the presence of Type-II adversary.
The MBR point is defined by the (α, β) relationship α = dβ [3]. Substituting this in (11), we get that the optimal secure file
size BS must satisfy
BS ≤
(
kd−
(
k
2
))
β −
(
ld−
(
l
2
))
β. (64)
Notice that (64) is identical to the tradeoff regions specified by Theorems 1-5 with the corresponding values of l. This
equivalence is further explained below.
Secure codes that achieve this MBR point for a general (n, k, d)-DSS with any l < k compromised nodes have been
described in [10] for both Type-I and Type-II attacks (since α = dβ at the MBR point, the eavesdropper does not get any
additional information by wiretapping the repair process i.e., Type-I and Type-II attacks are equivalent at the MBR point). For
example, in the (3, 2, 2)-DSS with l = 1, the MBR point in (64) is simplified as BSII = β;α = 2β, which is the α = 2, β = 1,
BSII = 1 point shown in Fig. 3, whose achievability is given in Fig. 2. In the (4, 3, 3)-DSS with l = 1, (64) is given by
BSII = 3β;α = 3β, which is also the α = 3, β = 1, BSII = 3 point shown in Fig. 5. Along similar lines, with l = 2, the MBR
point in (64) is given by BSII = β;α = 3β, i.e., the α = 3, β = 1, BSII = 1 point shown in Fig. 6. For the (4, 2, 3)-DSS, with
l = 1, we have α = 3, β = 1 and BSII = 2, i.e., MBR point in Fig. 4. For the (n, n− 1, n− 1)-DSS, with l = n− 2, we have
α = n− 1, β = 1 and BSII = 1, i.e., the MBR point in Fig. 7. For more information on the codes that achieve the MBR point,
please see [10].
B. Achievability under Type-I security constraint
At the MBR point, the Type-I and Type-II security constraints are equivalent and hence the MBR point is achievable under
both these constraints [10]. Beyond this MBR point, a spectrum of points in the secure storage-vs-exact-repair-bandwidth
tradeoff region are achievable in the presence of a Type-I adversary. We next present the various coding schemes that achieve
these points.
1) (α, β) = (1, 1), BSI = 1 in a (3, 2, 2)-DSS, l = 1: The coding scheme that achieves this point is shown in Fig. 1. In
this scheme, X ∈ Fq and K the secure key, is a random variable that is uniformly distributed over Fq such that q > 3. From
Fig. 1, it is easy to see that the repair and the reconstruction processes are straightforward.
2) (α, β) = (2, 1), BSI = 2 in a (4, 2, 3)-DSS, l = 1: This point corresponds to the normalized (α, β) pair i.e., (α¯, β¯) = (1, 12 )
in the Fig. 4. Let a1, a2 denote the message symbols to be stored in the DSS. Choose keys k1 and k2 to securely store the
data on the DSS. Here a1, a2, k1, k2 ∈ F5. Let x1, x2, x3, x4 denote 4 linearly independent combinations of the message and
key symbols. They are stored in the DSS as shown in Table I. Notice that the eavesdropper cannot infer any information by
observing the data contents on any single storage node. Further, the repair and reconstruction processes are straightforward.
3) (α, β) = (1, 1), BSI = 2 in a (4, 3, 3)-DSS, l = 1: This point corresponds to the normalized (α, β) pair i.e., (α¯, β¯) = (12 , 12 )
in the Fig. 5. Below, we present a coding scheme that can store a file of size BS = 2 securely in a (4, 3, 3)-DSS with l = 1
when each node stores α = 1 unit of data and sends β = 1 unit of data for the repair of failed nodes.
Let a1, a2 ∈ F2 denote the message symbols to be stored in the DSS. Choose a key k that is uniformly distributed over F2
in order to securely store the data on the DSS. The resulting DSS is shown in Table. II. Since the eavesdropper is unaware
TABLE I
A (4, 2, 3) SECURE EXACT REPAIR CODE FOR (α, β) = (2, 1), BS = 2.
first symbol second symbol
node 1 x1 x2
node 2 x3 x4
node 3 x1 + x3 x2 + x4
node 4 x1 + x4 x2 + x3
TABLE II
A (4, 3, 3) SECURE EXACT REPAIR CODE FOR (α, β) = (1, 1), BS = 2.
node 1 node 2 node 3 node 4
a1 + k a1 + k a1 + a2 + k k
of the key k, it cannot decode either a1 or a2 from any of the nodes in the DSS, thereby securing the DSS against Type-I
attacks.
Further, it is easy to see that the file (a1, a2) can be recovered from any k = 3 nodes (by using 3 linearly independent
combinations of 3 symbols a1, a2 and k). Consider the repair process of the 1st node. The nodes 2, 3 and 4 send their data
contents in order to repair this failed node. See that a1 and k can be recovered from these three data symbols and that a1 + k,
the contents of the 1st node can be restored exactly.
4) (α, β) = (3, 2), BSI = 5 in a (4, 3, 3)-DSS, l = 1: This point corresponds to the normalized (α, β) pair i.e., (α¯, β¯) = (35 , 25 )
in the Fig. 5. This can be shown through a coding scheme that can securely store a file of size BS = 5 over n = 4 nodes
where each node stores 3 units of data and sends 2 units of data for repair of other nodes. Let (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) ∈ Fq denote
the message symbols to be stored in the DSS. Let (k1, k2, k3) be the secure keys that are used by the DSS to keep the data
secure from the eavesdropper. It is assumed that these keys are uniformly distributed over Fq for some q > 8.
Let A = [a1, a2, a3, a4, a5]T and K = [k1, k2, k3]T represent the message and the secure key vectors. Let
X = [A K]
[
GA
GK
]
= GAA+GKK, (65)
be the 1× 12 vector of symbols to be stored on a DSS. Let
[
GA
GK
]
be a 8× 12 Vandermonde matrix such that the ith row is
defined as [1, i, i2, i3, . . . , i11] where i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. Here, GA is a 5× 12 sub matrix obtained from the above Vandermonde
matrix given by 
1, 1, 12, . . . , 111
1, 2, 22, . . . , 211
...
1, 5, 52, . . . , 511
 (66)
and GK is a 3× 12 sub matrix given by 1, 6, 62, . . . , 6111, 7, 72, . . . , 711
1, 8, 82, . . . , 811
 (67)
Since we use a 8 × 12 Vandermonde matrix, we define all the elements over F9. The resulting elements of X are stored in
the DSS as shown in Table III.
In order to achieve secrecy, i.e., the eavesdropper should not get any information about {aj}5j=1 by observing the contents
of any single node, the following condition must hold true.,
I(A; [X]3) = 0 (68)
where [X]3 is any 3 elements of the vector X (since any 3 elements of X are linearly independent combinations of A and
K). We can represent [X]3 as
[X]3 = [A K]
[
GˆA
GˆK
]
8×3
, (69)
TABLE III
A (4, 3, 3) SECURE EXACT REPAIR CODE FOR (α, β) = (3, 2), BS = 5.
first symbol second symbol third symbol
node 1 x1 x2 x9 = x6 + x7
node 2 x3 x4 x10 = x1 + x8
node 3 x5 x6 x11 = x2 + x3
node 4 x7 x8 x12 = x4 + x5
TABLE IV
REPAIR PROCEDURE OF A (4, 3, 3) SECURE EXACT REPAIR CODE WHEN NODE 1 FAILS.
first symbol second symbol
node 2 x3 x10 = x1 + x8
node 3 x6 x11 = x2 + x3
node 4 x7 x8
where GˆA, GˆK are sub matrices of
[
GA
GK
]
that correspond to [X]3. Notice that these sub matrices are also Vandermonde
matrices. Thus we have the following set of inequalities,
I(A; [X]3) = I(A; GˆAA+ GˆKK)
= H(GˆAA+ GˆKK)−H(GˆAA+ GˆKK|A)
= H(GˆAA+ GˆKK)−H(GˆKK)
≤ 3− rank
(
GˆK
)
= 3− 3 = 0,
The last two inequalities follow from the fact that the sub-Vandermonde matrices have a maximum rank of 3.
Repair Process: Since this is a cyclic construction, every node is equivalent. Without loss of generality, it suffices to consider
the repair of any single node. Consider the case when node 1 fails and the other nodes participate in the repair process. Since
β = 2, each node sends 2 symbols to aid the repair of the 1st node. The repair process of node 1 is shown in Table IV. The
first symbol of node 1 is recovered by combining the second symbols sent by nodes 2 and 4. The second symbol of node 1 is
obtained by a combination of the first symbol sent by node 2 and the second symbol sent by node 3. Finally, the third symbol
of node 1 is recovered by a combination of the first symbols sent by nodes 3 and 4. Hence, upon receiving the 6 symbols, it
can be seen that the 1st node can exactly recover its original symbols, thereby satisfying the requirements of an exact repair
code.
Remark 1: This code construction can be easily extended to the exact repair case in the absence of an eaves-
dropper. In the absence of an eavesdropper (no requirement for keys), this code can store a file size of 8({xj}8j=1, no linear combinations required) in n = 4 nodes with each node storing α = 3 units of data and sending β = 2
units for the repair process. Thus this code achieves a normalized storage-bandwidth tradeoff point ( 38 ,
1
4 ) which is shown to
be optimal in [7]. Further, this code is also efficient in terms of the disk reads required for a repair process compared to the
code proposed for the exact repair of a (4, 3, 3)-DSS in [7]. It is seen that the number of disk reads required in this proposed
code is 6 (6 symbols obtained directly from the nodes) while it is 9 in the case of the code proposed in [7] (see [7] for more
details). This behavior is akin to the codes proposed in [13] that are designed to be data-read and download efficient during
a repair process.
5) (α, β) = (1, 1), BS = 1 in a (4, 3, 3)-DSS, l = 2: Let a ∈ Fq denote the message symbol to be stored on the DSS. Since
l = 2, any two nodes need to be secure from the eavesdropping attack. Hence we choose two keys k1, k2 that are uniformly
distributed in Fq in order to securely store a. Let X = [x1, x2, x3, x4]T denote the storage contents of the 4 nodes in the DSS
such that
X = [GA GK ]
 ak1
k2
 = GAa+GK [k1k2
]
, (70)
where GA and GK are chosen such that rank ([GA GK ]) = 3 and rank (GK) = 2 (for instance Vandermonde matrices similar
to Section V-B4).
{xi}4i=1 are the linear combinations of the message symbol a and the secure keys k1, k2. The rank of the concatenated
matrix [GA GK ] ensures that the file can be recovered from any 3 out of the 4 nodes in the DSS (3 linearly independent
combinations of 3 symbols), thereby satisfying the reconstruction property of the DSS. By following the similar arguments in
Section V-B4, it can be shown that the rank of the matrix GK which is 2, ensures that the storage contents on any two nodes
are secure from a Type-I attack by an eavesdropper.
Remark 2: The above coding scheme can be extended to a general (n, n − 1, n − 1)-DSS with l = n − 2 to achieve the
(α, β) = (1, 1), BS = 1 point under exact repair and Type-I secrecy as shown in Fig. 7.
Remark 3: Although the same (α, β) = (3, 1) pair is achievable under Type-II secrecy when l = 1 or l = 2 for the (4, 3, 3)-
DSS, it is seen that the maximum file size that can be securely stored when l = 1 is BS = 3 while it is BS = 1 when l = 2.
Intuitively, when 2 nodes in the DSS are compromised, the secrecy constraints are stringent compared to the case when only
one node is compromised and hence the file size that can be securely stored decreases when the number of compromised nodes
increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Securing distributed storage systems against passive eavesdropping attacks is addressed in this paper. A complete
characterization of the storage-bandwidth tradeoff region is provided for a (n, k, d)-DSS for n ≤ 4 and l < k under exact
repair and Type-I, Type-II secrecy constraints. These results have been extended to the (n, n − 1, n − 1)-DSS when n − 2
nodes are compromised. Novel regenerating codes that are read and download repair efficient are presented in order to achieve
these optimal secure tradeoff regions. The converse proof for the optimal tradeoff region under Type-I secrecy constraint was
leveraged off the proof presented for the exact repair tradeoff region in the absence of an eavesdropper. Novel converse proofs
were presented under the Type-II secrecy constraints, thereby characterizing the maximum file size that can be securely stored
in a DSS. As expected, the file size that can be securely stored decreases when the number of compromised nodes increases
in the DSS. The gap in the file size that can be securely stored under Type-I and Type-II attacks increases as n increases,
thereby indicating the severe limitations of the DSS under Type-II attacks. Further, the secure storage-vs-exact repair bandwidth
tradeoff region obtained for the Type-II attacks indicates that the MBR point is the only achievable point in the corresponding
tradeoff region. Extending these results to a general (n, k, d)-DSS is part of our ongoing work.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2: (4, 2, 3)-DSS, l = 1
In this section, we present the proof for the Type-II setting for the the (4, 2, 3)-DSS and l = 1. In particular we will show
that
BSII ≤ min
(
2α
3
, 2β
)
. (71)
To this end, we focus on proving that BSII ≤ 2α3 .
• File regeneration from any k = 2 nodes:
H(F |W1,W2) = 0 (72)
H(F |W1,W3) = 0 (73)
H(F |W1,W4) = 0 (74)
H(F |W2,W3) = 0 (75)
H(F |W2,W4) = 0 (76)
H(F |W3,W4) = 0. (77)
• Exact repair requirements:
H(W1|S21, S31, S41) = 0 (78)
H(W2|S12, S32, S42) = 0 (79)
H(W3|S13, S23, S43) = 0 (80)
H(W4|S14, S24, S34) = 0. (81)
• Secure repair of any l = 1 node:
I(F ;S21, S31, S41) = 0 (82)
I(F ;S12, S32, S42) = 0 (83)
I(F ;S13, S23, S43) = 0 (84)
I(F ;S14, S24, S34) = 0. (85)
• Repair data from a node is a function of stored data:
H(S12, S13, S14|W1) = 0 (86)
H(S21, S23, S24|W2) = 0 (87)
H(S31, S32, S34|W3) = 0 (88)
H(S41, S42, S43|W4) = 0. (89)
For secure repair of node 1, we have
H(F ) = H(F |S21, S31, S41) (90)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41)−H(S21, S31, S41) (91)
(149)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41)−H(S21, S31, S41, S12) (92)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41)−H(S12, S21)−H(S31, S41|S12, S21). (93)
Similarly, for secure repair of node 2, we have
H(F ) = H(F |S12, S32, S42) (94)
= H(F, S12, S32, S42)−H(S12, S32, S42) (95)
(150)
= H(F, S12, S32, S42)−H(S12, S31, S41, S21) (96)
= H(F, S12, S32, S42)−H(S12, S21)−H(S32, S42|S12, S21). (97)
Adding (90) and (94), we obtain
2H(F ) = H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S12, S32, S42)− 2H(S12, S21)−H(S31, S41|S12, S21)−H(S32, S42|S12, S21) (98)
≤ H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S12, S32, S42)−H(S12, S21)−H(S31, S41, S32, S42, S12, S21) (99)
≤ H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S12, S32, S42)−H(S21)−H(S31, S41, S32, S42, S12, S21). (100)
Notice that,
H(S31, S41, S32, S42, S12, S21) = H(S31, S41, S32, S42, S12, S21,W1,W2, F ) (101)
≥ H(F, S21, S31, S41) (102)
= H(S21, S31, S41) +H(F |S21, S31, S41) (103)
(153)
= H(S21, S31, S41) +H(F ). (104)
Using (101) in (98), we get
2H(F ) ≤ H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S12, S32, S42)−H(S21)− (H(S21, S31, S41) +H(F )). (105)
We bound the first term in the above equation as follows
H(F, S21, S31, S41) ≤ H(F, S21, S31, S41,W4) (106)
(74)
= H(S21, S31, S41,W4) (107)
= H(W4) +H(S41|W4) +H(S21, S31|S41,W4) (108)
≤ H(W4) +H(S21, S31|S41) (109)
= H(W4) +H(S21, S31, S41)−H(S41) (110)
≤ α+H(S21, S31, S41)−H(S41). (111)
By symmetry, we can show that
H(F, S12, S32, S42) = H(F, S21, S31, S41). (112)
Hence, we can bound
H(F, S12, S32, S42) ≤ α+H(S21, S31, S41)−H(S41). (113)
Substituting (111) and (113) in (105), we have
2H(F ) ≤ 2α+ 2H(S21, S31, S41)− 2H(S41)−H(S21)−H(F )−H(S21, S31, S41) (114)
3H(F ) ≤ 2α+H(S21, S31, S41)− 2H(S41)−H(S21). (115)
Similarly, we have
3H(F ) ≤ 2α+H(S21, S31, S41)− 2H(S21)−H(S31) (116)
3H(F ) ≤ 2α+H(S21, S31, S41)− 2H(S21)−H(S41) (117)
3H(F ) ≤ 2α+H(S21, S31, S41)− 2H(S31)−H(S21) (118)
3H(F ) ≤ 2α+H(S21, S31, S41)− 2H(S31)−H(S41) (119)
3H(F ) ≤ 2α+H(S21, S31, S41)− 2H(S41)−H(S31) (120)
(121)
By using the fact that
H(S21, S31, S41) ≤ H(S21) +H(S31) +H(S41), (122)
and summing all the above 6 inequalities, we have
3H(F ) ≤ 2α =⇒ BSII ≤
2α
3
. (123)
B. Proof of Theorem 3: (4, 3, 3)-DSS, l = 1
1) Converse for Type-I secrecy constraint: We note that for (4, 3, 3)-DSS and l = 1, under Type-I secrecy constraint, the
optimal (α, β)-tradeoff is given by
BSI ≤ min
(
min(α, 2β) + min(α, β),
α+ 6β
3
)
. (124)
We note that the following bound
BSI ≤ min(α, 2β) + min(α, β). (125)
follows directly from (11). Hence, in the remainder of this section, we will show that
BSI ≤
α+ 6β
3
. (126)
This proof of this bound closely follows a recent result in [7] which presents the optimal (α, β)-tradeoff for the (4, 3, 3)-DSS
in the absence of secrecy constraint. The key difference is carefully incorporating the Type-I secrecy constraint as we will
highlight during the proof. We proceed (similar to [7]) as follows:
8H(W4) + 4H(S31, S21) + 4H(S32)
≥ 4H(S31, S21,W4) + 4H(S32,W4)
≥ 4H(S31, S21,W4) + 4H(S32,W4)− 2I(S21;W3|W4)− 2I(W3;W4|S32, S34, S24) (127)
(a)
= 4H(S31, S21,W4) + 2H(W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S21)− 2H(W3,W4) + 2H(S32, S34, S24)
+ 2H(W3,W4, S24, S32, S34)− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24)
(b)
≥ 4H(S31, S21,W4) + 2H(W4) + 2
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
− 2H(W3,W4) + 2H(S32, S34, S24)
+ 2H(W3,W4, S24, S32, S34)− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24), (128)
where
• (a) follows by expanding all the mutual information expressions; then using the fact that (S32, S34) is a function of W3;
and finally using the symmetry (henceforth referred in short by (sym)), which implies that H(S32,W4) = H(S24,W3) =
H(S21,W4). In general we have H(S,W) = H(pi(S), pi(W)) where S ⊆ {Sij}4i,j=1, i 6= j, W ⊆ {Wj}4j=1 and pi is a
permutation of the indices i, j [7].
• (b) is the key inequality that invokes the secrecy constraint; and can be proved as follows
H(W3,W4, S21) = H(F,W3,W4, S21)
≥ H(F,W4)
= H(F ) +H(W4)− I(F ;W4)
= H(F ) +H(W4).
in which the first equality follows from the fact that the file F can be recovered from (W3,W4, S21) and the last equality
follows from the Type-I secrecy constraint, i.e., I(F ;W4) = 0.
Next, we lower bound the following term that appears in (128):
H(S31, S21,W4) +H(S32, S34, S24)
(sym)
= H(S34, S24,W1) +H(S32, S34, S24)
= H(W1|S34, S24) +H(S32|S34, S24) + 2H(S34, S24)
≥ H(W1, S32|S34, S24) + 2H(S34, S24)
= H(W1, S32, S34, S24) +H(S34, S24)
(rep)
= H(W1,W2,W4) +H(S34, S24)
= H(W1,W2,W4, F ) +H(S34, S24)
≥ H(W4, F ) +H(S34, S24)
= H(W4) +H(F ) +H(S34, S24), (129)
where the fourth equality in obtained by noticing that the file F can be recovered using (W1, S32, S34, S24) and the fact that
Sij is a function of Wi. This is shown below.
H(W1, S32, S34, S24) = H(W1, S14, S32, S34, S24)
= H(W1,W4, S32)
= H(W1, S12,W4, S42, S32)
= H(W1,W2,W4),
This property is henceforth denoted by (rep) or repair in the rest of the converse proof. The equation (129) follows from
Type-I secrecy constraint. Substituting (129) in (128), we have the following
8H(W4) + 4H(S31, S21) + 4H(S32)
≥ 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 2H(W4) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
− 2H(W3,W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S24)
− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24) + 2H(S34, S24)
(sym)
= 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 2H(W4) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
− 2H(W3,W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S24)
− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24) + 2H(S31, S21)
≥ 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 2H(S31, S21,W4)− 2H(W3,W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S24)
− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
= 4H(S31, S21,W4) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
− 2H(W3,W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S24)− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24). (130)
Next, we have the following inequality:
H(W3,W4, S24)−H(W3,W4) = H(S24|W3,W4)
≥ H(S24|S13,W3,W4)
= H(S24, S13,W3,W4)−H(S13,W3,W4). (131)
Using (131) to further lower bound (130), we get
8H(W4) + 4H(S31, S21) + 4H(S32) ≥ 4H(S31, S21,W4) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
− 2H(S13,W3,W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S24, S13)
− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24)
(rep)
= 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 2H(S31, S21,W4,W1)
− 2H(S13,W3,W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S24, S13)
− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
(sym)
= 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 2H(S13, S23,W4,W3)
− 2H(S13,W3,W4) + 2H(W3,W4, S24, S13)
− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
. (132)
Next, we have the following inequality
H(S13, S23,W4,W3) +H(W3,W4, S24, S13)−H(S13,W3,W4) = H(S23|S13,W3,W4) +H(S24|S13,W3,W4)
+H(S13,W3,W4)
≥ H(S23, S24|S13,W3,W4) +H(S13,W3,W4)
= H(S23, S24, S13,W3,W4). (133)
Using (133) in (132), we obtain
8H(W4) + 4H(S31, S21) + 4H(S32) ≥ 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+ 2H(S23, S24, S13,W3,W4)− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24)
≥ 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+ 2H(S23, S24, S13,W3,W4)− 2H(W4, S32, S34, S24, S14)
(c)
= 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 4
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+ 2H(S23, S24, S13,W3,W4)− 2H(S32, S34, S24, S14), (134)
where (c) follows as W4 is a function of (S14, S24, S34). Next, we have
2H(S23, S24, S13,W3,W4)
(sym)
= H(S23, S24, S14,W3,W4) +H(S34, S32, S14,W2,W4)
(rep)
= H(S23, S24, S14, S32, S34,W3,W4)
+H(S34, S32, S14, S24, S23,W2,W4)
= H(W3,W4|S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
+H(W2,W4|S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
+ 2H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
≥ H(W2,W3,W4, S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
+H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
≥ H(W2,W3,W4) +H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
= H(W2,W3,W4, F ) +H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
≥ H(W4, F ) +H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
=
[
H(W4) +H(F )
]
+H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32), (135)
where (135) follows from the Type-I secrecy constraint. Using (135) in (134) gives
8H(W4) + 4H(S31, S21) + 4H(S32) ≥ 2H(S31, S21,W4) + 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
− 2H(S32, S34, S24, S14) +H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
(sym)
= 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(S31, S21,W4) +H(S14, S24,W3)
− 2H(S32, S34, S24, S14) +H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
(rep)
= 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(S31, S21,W4) +H(S14, S24, S32, S34,W3)
− 2H(S32, S34, S24, S14) +H(S14, S24, S34, S23, S32)
= 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(S31, S21,W4) +H(W3|S14, S24, S32, S34)
+H(S23|S14, S24, S32, S34)
≥ 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(S31, S21,W4) +H(W3, S23|S14, S24, S32, S34). (136)
Finally, using symmetry, we write H(S31, S21,W4) as:
H(S31, S21,W4)
(sym)
= H(S14, S34,W2)
(rep)
= H(W2, S14, S34, S23, S24). (137)
On the other hand, we also have
H(W3, S23|S14, S24, S32, S34) = H(W3, S23, S14, S24, S32, S34)−H(S14, S24, S32, S34)
(sym)
= H(W3, S23, S14, S24, S32, S34)−H(S14, S24, S32, S23)
= H(W3, S32|S14, S34, S23, S24)
≥ H(W3, S32|W2, S14, S34, S23, S24). (138)
Using (137) and (138), we have from (136)
8H(W4) + 4H(S31, S21) + 4H(S32) ≥ 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(W2,W3, S32, S14, S24, S34, S23)
(rep)
= 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(W2,W3,W4, S32, S14, S24, S34, S23)
≥ 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(W2,W3,W4)
= 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(W2,W3,W4, F )
≥ 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(W4, F )
= 5
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
+H(W4) +H(F ) (139)
= 6
[
H(F ) +H(W4)
]
, (140)
where (139) follows from Type-I secrecy constraint. Hence, from (140), we have
6H(F ) ≤ 2H(W4) + 4H(S31, S21) + 4H(S32) (141)
≤ 2α+ 12β, (142)
which implies that 3H(F ) ≤ α+ 6β and hence we have the proof of the bound:
BSI ≤
α+ 6β
3
. (143)
2) Converse for Type-II Constraint: For this case, we will show that the existing bound (11) BSII ≤ min(α, 2β)+min(α, β)
is strictly loose and the secure storage-repair bandwidth tradeoff is given by
BSII ≤ min(α, 3β). (144)
To this end, we focus on proving that BSII ≤ α.
• File regeneration from any k = 3 nodes:
H(F |W1,W2,W3) = 0 (145)
H(F |W1,W2,W4) = 0 (146)
H(F |W1,W3,W4) = 0 (147)
H(F |W2,W3,W4) = 0. (148)
• Exact repair requirements:
H(W1|S21, S31, S41) = 0 (149)
H(W2|S12, S32, S42) = 0 (150)
H(W3|S13, S23, S43) = 0 (151)
H(W4|S14, S24, S34) = 0. (152)
• Secure repair of any l = 1 node:
I(F ;S21, S31, S41) = 0 (153)
I(F ;S12, S32, S42) = 0 (154)
I(F ;S13, S23, S43) = 0 (155)
I(F ;S14, S24, S34) = 0. (156)
• Repair data from a node is a function of stored data:
H(S12, S13, S14|W1) = 0 (157)
H(S21, S23, S24|W2) = 0 (158)
H(S31, S32, S34|W3) = 0 (159)
H(S41, S42, S43|W4) = 0. (160)
For secure repair of node 1, we have
H(F )
(153)
= H(F |S21, S31, S41)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41)−H(S21, S31, S41)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41)−H(S21)−H(S31|S21)−H(S41|S31, S21). (161)
Similarly, for secure repair of node 2, we have
H(F )
(154)
= H(F |S12, S32, S42)
(150)
= H(F |S12, S32, S42,W2)
(158)
= H(F |S12, S32, S42,W2, S21, S23)
≤ H(F |S21, S23, S42)
= H(F, S21, S23, S42)−H(S21, S23, S42)
= H(F, S21, S23, S42)−H(S21)−H(S23|S21)−H(S42|S23, S21). (162)
Adding (161) and (162), we obtain
2H(F ) ≤ H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)− 2H(S21)−H(S31|S21)−H(S23|S21)
−H(S41|S31, S21)−H(S42|S23, S21)
≤ H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)− 2H(S21)−H(S31, S23|S21)
−H(S41|S31, S21)−H(S42|S23, S21)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)−H(S21)−H(S21, S31, S23)
−H(S41|S31, S21)−H(S42|S23, S21)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)−H(S21, S31, S23)
−H(S21)−H(S41|S21)−H(S42|S21) + I(S41;S31|S21) + I(S42;S23|S21)
≤ H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)−H(S21, S31, S23)
−H(S21)−H(S41, S42|S21) + I(S41;S31|S21) + I(S42;S23|S21)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)
−H(S21, S23, S31)−H(S41, S42, S21) + I(S41;S31|S21) + I(S42;S23|S21)
=
[
H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)
]
− 2H(S21, S23, S31) + I(S41;S31|S21) + I(S42;S23|S21), (163)
where in (163), we have replaced H(S41, S42, S21) by H(S31, S23, S21) by invoking the following symmetry property:
H(S41, S42, S21) = H(S31, S32, S21) = H(S31, S23, S21).
Next, consider the term H(F, S21, S31, S41) appearing in (163):
H(F, S21, S31, S41) ≤ H(F,W4, S23, S21, S31, S41)
= H(W4, S23, S21, S31) +H(F, S41|W4, S23, S21, S31)
= H(W4, S23, S21, S31) (164)
= H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(W4;S21, S31, S23)
≤ H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S41;S21, S31, S23) (165)
≤ H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S41;S21, S31)
≤ H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S41;S31|S21)
≤ α+H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S41;S31|S21). (166)
where (164) follows from the fact that S41 is a function of W4; and the fact that the file F can be recovered from
W4, S23, S21, S31. Equation (165) follows from the fact that S41 is a function of W4 and by using data processing inequality.
Similarly, for the term H(F, S21, S23, S42) in (163):
H(F, S21, S23, S42) ≤ H(F,W4, S21, S23, S42, S31)
= H(W4, S23, S21, S31) +H(F, S42|W4, S23, S21, S31)
= H(W4, S23, S21, S31)
= H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(W4;S21, S31, S23)
≤ H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S42;S21, S31, S23)
≤ H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S42;S21, S23)
≤ H(W4) +H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S42;S23|S21)
≤ α+H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S42;S23|S21). (167)
Adding (166) and (167), we arrive at[
H(F, S21, S31, S41) +H(F, S21, S23, S42)
]
≤ 2α+ 2H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S41;S31|S21)− I(S42;S23|S21). (168)
Substituting (168) in (163), we obtain
2H(F ) ≤ 2α+ 2H(S23, S21, S31)− I(S41;S31|S21)− I(S42;S23|S21)
− 2H(S21, S23, S31) + I(S41;S31|S21) + I(S42;S23|S21) (169)
= 2α, (170)
which yields H(F ) ≤ α and hence we have the proof for
BSII ≤ α. (171)
C. Proof of Theorem 4: (4, 3, 3)-DSS, l = 2
Here, we focus on the case of (4, 3, 3)-DSS and l = 2. For this case, we will show that the secure storage-repair bandwidth
tradeoff is given by
BSII ≤ min
(α
3
, β
)
. (172)
For secure repair of any l = 2 nodes, we have the following
(
4
2
)
= 6 constraints:
I(F ;S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42) = 0 (173)
I(F ;S21, S31, S41, S13, S23, S43) = 0 (174)
I(F ;S12, S32, S42, S13, S23, S43) = 0 (175)
I(F ;S21, S31, S41, S14, S24, S34) = 0 (176)
I(F ;S12, S32, S42, S14, S24, S34) = 0 (177)
I(F ;S13, S23, S43, S14, S24, S34) = 0. (178)
With these secure repair constraints, and exact repair requirements, we will now show that
BSII ≤
α
3
. (179)
For the secure repair of nodes 1 and 2, we have
H(F )
(173)
= H(F |S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42)
= H(F, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42)−H(S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42). (180)
We first focus on the term H(F, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42) and bound it as follows:
H(F, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42) ≤ H(F,W4, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42)
= H(W4, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42) +H(F |W4, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42)
= H(W4, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42) +H(F |W4,W1,W2, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42)
(181)
= H(W4, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42) (182)
= H(W4, S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42, S23, S13) (183)
= H(W4, S21, S31, S12, S32, S23, S13) (184)
= H(W4, U123), (185)
where (181) follows from the fact that W1 can be obtained from (S21, S31, S41) and W2 can be obtained from (S12, S32, S42).
Next, (182) follows from (146). (183) follows from the fact that W2 (and hence S23) is a function of (S12, S32, S42). Similarly,
W1 (and hence S13) is a function of (S21, S31, S41). Finally, (184) follows from the fact that (S41, S42) are functions of W4.
In (185), we have defined
U123 , (S21, S12, S31, S13, S32, S23). (186)
Substituting (185) in (180), we have
H(F ) ≤ H(W4, U123)−H(S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42)
(a)
= H(W4, U123)−H(S21, S31, S41, S12, S32, S42, S23, S13)
= H(W4, U123)−H(S21, S12, S31, S13, S32, S23)−H(S41, S42|S21, S12, S31, S13, S32, S23)
(b)
= H(W4, U123)−H(U123)−H(S41, S42|U123)
where (a) follows from the fact that W2 (and hence S23) is a function of (S12, S32, S42). Similarly, W1 (and hence S13) is a
function of (S21, S31, S41). In (b), we have used the variable U123 as defined in (186).
In summary, for secure repair of nodes 1 and 2, we have
H(F ) ≤ H(W4, U123)−H(U123)−H(S41, S42|U123). (187)
Similarly, for secure repair of nodes 1 and 3, we have
H(F ) ≤ H(W4, U123)−H(U123)−H(S41, S43|U123), (188)
and for secure repair of nodes 2 and 3, we can obtain
H(F ) ≤ H(W4, U123)−H(U123)−H(S42, S43|U123). (189)
Summing up (187), (188) and (189), we obtain
3H(F ) ≤ 3H(W4, U123)− 3H(U123)−H(S41, S42|U123)−H(S41, S43|U123)−H(S42, S43|U123). (190)
We next note that for any four random variables (X,Y, Z, U), the following inequality holds:
H(X,Y |U)+H(X,Z|U)+H(Y,Z|U)≥ 2H(X,Y, Z|U). (191)
This inequality can be proved as follows:
H(X,Y |U) +H(X,Z|U) +H(Y,Z|U) = H(X,Y |U) +H(Z|U) +H(X|Z,U) +H(Y,Z|U)
≥ H(X,Y |U) +H(Z|X,Y, U) +H(X|Y, Z, U) +H(Y,Z|U)
= 2H(X,Y, Z|U).
Using the inequality (191) by letting X = S41, Y = S42, Z = S43 and U = U123 in (190), we obtain
3H(F ) ≤ 3H(W4, U123)− 3H(U123)−H(S41, S42|U123)−H(S41, S43|U123)−H(S42, S43|U123)
≤ 3H(W4, U123)− 3H(U123)− 2H(S41, S42, S43|U123)
= 3H(W4, U123)−H(U123)− 2H(S41, S42, S43, U123)
= 3H(W4, U123)−H(U123)− 2H(W4, S41, S42, S43, U123) + 2H(W4|S41, S42, S43, U123)
= 3H(W4, U123)−H(U123)− 2H(W4, S41, S42, S43, U123) (192)
≤ 3H(W4, U123)−H(U123)− 2H(W4, U123)
= H(W4, U123)−H(U123)
≤ H(W4) +H(U123)−H(U123)
= H(W4)
≤ α, (193)
where (192) follows from the fact that H(W4|S41, S42, S43, U123) = 0. Hence, from (193), we have shown that 3H(F ) ≤ α,
and thus we have the proof for
BSII ≤
α
3
. (194)
D. Proof of Theorem 5: (n, n− 1, n− 1)-DSS, l = (n− 2).
In this section, we present the proof for the Type-II setting for the more general (n, n − 1, n − 1)-DSS and l = n − 2. In
particular, we will show that
BSII ≤ min
(
α
n− 1 , β
)
. (195)
To this end, we focus on proving that BSII ≤ αn−1 . From Type-II security requirement we require:
I(F ;Spi1 , Spi2 , . . . , Spin−2) = 0, (196)
where Spir is the repair data (from the remaining d = (n− 1) alive nodes) that is used to repair the pirth node. Note that there
are
(
n
n−2
)
= n(n− 1)/2 such constraints; each corresponding to the secure repair of a set of l = (n− 2) nodes.
Let us consider the first k = (n − 1) nodes, i.e., nodes 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. For secure repair of any l = (n − 2) out of these
(n− 1) nodes, we have (kl) = (n−1n−2) = (n− 1) constraints. Before describing these constraints, we note that the repair data
(coming from the remaining (n− 1) alive nodes) for node i is given by:
Si = (S1i, . . . , S(i−1)i, S(i+1)i, . . . , Sni). (197)
Using this, we define
S[1:n−1] , (S1, S2, . . . , Sn−1), (198)
where S[1:n−1] is the collective repair data that is used to repair the first k = (n− 1) nodes. Next, we define
Uij , (Sij , Sji), (199)
where Uij consists of the repair data Sij that node i sends in repair of node j, and the repair data Sji that node j sends in
the repair of node i. Using this, we define for any set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n}:
S
(j)
A , {Uij : i ∈ A} (200)
UA , {Uij : (i, j) ∈ A, i 6= j}. (201)
With these definitions in place, we can write the (n− 1) Type-II secrecy constraints for the first (n− 1) nodes as follows:
I(F ;S[1:n−1] \ {S1}) = 0 (202)
I(F ;S[1:n−1] \ {S2}) = 0 (203)
...
I(F ;S[1:n−1] \ {Sn−1}) = 0. (204)
where we have defined
S[1:n−1] \ {Si} , (S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sn−1), (205)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , (n− 1).
Using the constraint (202) (i.e., secure repair of nodes (2, 3, . . . , n− 1)), we have the following:
H(F ) = H(F |S[1:n−1] \ {S1})
= H(F, S[1:n−1] \ {S1})−H(S[1:n−1] \ {S1}). (206)
Let us focus on the first term appearing in (206):
H(F, S[1:n−1] \ {S1}) ≤ H(F,Wn, S[1:n−1] \ {S1})
= H(Wn, S[1:n−1] \ {S1}) +H(F |Wn, S[1:n−1] \ {S1})
= H(Wn, S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1) +H(F |Wn, S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1)
≤ H(Wn, S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1) +H(F |Wn,W2,W3, . . . ,Wn−1)
= H(Wn, S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1)
≤ H(Wn, S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1)
= H(Wn, U[1:n−1], S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1)
= H(Wn, U[1:n−1]) +H(S1, S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1|Wn, U[1:n−1])
= H(Wn, U[1:n−1]) +H(Sn1, Sn2, Sn3, . . . , Sn(n−1)|Wn, U[1:n−1])
= H(Wn, U[1:n−1]), (207)
where (207) follows from the fact that (Sn1, Sn2, . . . , Sn(n−1)) are all functions of Wn.
Next, we focus on the second term appearing in (206):
H(S[1:n−1] \ {S1}) = H(S2, . . . , Sn−1)
= H(S2, . . . , Sn−1, S21, S2n, . . . , S(n−1)1, S(n−1)n) (208)
= H(U[1:n−1], S
(n)
[2,3,...,n−1]) (209)
= H(U[1:n−1]) +H(S
(n)
[2,3,...,n−1]|U[1:n−1]), (210)
where (208) follows from the fact that Wi (and hence (Si1, Sin)) is a function of Si. Thus, as we have S2, we can add
S21, S2n; similarly, as we have Si, we can add (Si1, Sin) without increasing the entropy, for i = 2, 3, . . . , n. Finally, (209)
follows by directly expanding all the terms S2, S3, . . . , Sn−1 and compactly expressing all the variables by using the definitions
of U[1:n−1] and S
(n)
[2,3,...,n−1] which were defined in (201) and (200).
Using (207) and (210) in (206), we obtain
H(F ) ≤ H(Wn, U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])−H
(
S
(n)
[2,3,...,n−1]|U[1:n−1]
)
. (211)
In summary, from the secure repair constraint of nodes {1, . . . , n− 1} \ {1}, we have
H(F ) ≤ H(Wn, U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])−H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{1}|U[1:n−1]
)
. (212)
Similarly, for the secure repair of nodes {1, . . . , n− 1} \ {i}, we can obtain
H(F ) ≤ H(Wn, U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])−H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
. (213)
There are total of (n− 1) such bounds for i = 1, 2, . . . , (n− 1). Summing up these (n− 1) bounds, we obtain
(n− 1)H(F ) ≤ (n− 1)H(Wn, U[1:n−1])− (n− 1)H(U[1:n−1])−
n−1∑
i=1
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
. (214)
We next focus on the summand appearing in (214) for which we have the following inequality:
n−1∑
i=1
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
≥ (n− 2)H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]|U[1:n−1]
)
, (215)
which can be shown readily as follows:
n−1∑
i=1
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
+H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{1}|U[1:n−1]
)
(216)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
+H
(
S
(n)
[2,3,...,n−1]|U[1:n−1]
)
(217)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
+H
(
U2n, U3n, . . . , U(n−1)n|U[1:n−1]
)
(218)
=
n−1∑
i=2
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
+H
(
U2n|U[1:n−1]
)
+H
(
U3n|U2n, U[1:n−1]
)
+ . . .+H
(
U(n−1)n|U2n, U3n, . . . , U(n−2)n, U[1:n−1]
)
≥
n−1∑
i=2
H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]\{i}|U[1:n−1]
)
+H
(
U2n|S(n)[1:n−1]\{2}, U[1:n−1]
)
+H
(
U3n|S(n)[1:n−1]\{3}U[1:n−1]
)
+ . . .+H
(
U(n−1)n|S(n)[1:n−1]\{(n−1)}, U[1:n−1]
)
= (n− 2)H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]|U[1:n−1]
)
. (219)
This completes the proof for the bound (215).
Using (215) to further bound (214), we obtain
(n− 1)H(F ) ≤ (n− 1)H(Wn, U[1:n−1])− (n− 1)H(U[1:n−1])− (n− 2)H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1]|U[1:n−1]
)
= (n− 1)H(Wn, U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])− (n− 2)H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1], U[1:n−1]
)
= (n− 1)H(Wn, U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])− (n− 2)H
(
S
(n)
[1:n−1],Wn, U[1:n−1]
)
(220)
≤ (n− 1)H(Wn, U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])− (n− 2)H
(
Wn, U[1:n−1]
)
= H(Wn, U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])
≤ H(Wn) +H(U[1:n−1])−H(U[1:n−1])
= H(Wn)
≤ α, (221)
where (220) follows from the fact that Wn is a function of S
(n)
[1:n−1]. To note this, we observe that S
(n)
[1:n−1] among other
variables, consists of (S1n, S2n, . . . , S(n−1)n), which is precisely the repair data for regenerating the information stored in
node n (i.e., Wn).
Hence, (221) implies that (n− 1)H(F ) ≤ α, and hence we have the proof for the bound:
BSII ≤
α
n− 1 . (222)
